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Abstract
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1 Introduction
It has long been recognized that adherence to the Pareto principle may have distri-
butional consequences. In particular, the set of Pareto optimal allocations may not
contain any egalitarian allocation, so that equality and optimality are impossible to
reconcile. Philosophers, especially those adhering to the egalitarian tradition, have in-
tensively debated as to whether inequalities should be permitted in such cases, or the
Pareto principle abandoned.
Although there is no possible dispute as to the fact that the Pareto principle may
constrain the Social Planner in his willingness to achieve equality, it is also widely
believed that adherence to the Pareto principle does not make all concerns for inequality
irrelevant. The set of Pareto optimal allocations is typically thought of as being rich
enough for the planner to be left with a non trivial choice where his preferences for
equality may matter. Stated differently, it is usually believed that accepting the Pareto
principle does not prevent diverse degrees of inequality aversion from being expressed.
This conventional wisdom about the limited restrictiveness of the Pareto principle is
perfectly correct in deterministic or static cases. The aim of this paper is to show that
it does not extend to realistic cases, where dynamics and uncertainty are inevitably
at play. We show that in such cases adhering to the Pareto principle generally leaves
practically no room for redistributive considerations. More precisely, we prove that,
except in particular cases, two Paretian social observers with consequentialist and time
consistent preferences cannot express different but comparable concerns for equality.
Given a social observer with Paretian, consequentialist and time consistent preferences,
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it is impossible to find another Paretian, consequentialist and time consistent social
observer who would exhibit more (or less) aversion to inequality.
To grasp the intuition behind the result, imagine a population of identical individu-
als. In period one, all these individuals face the same decision problem, which consists
of making a choice under uncertainty, knowing that the consequence of one’s choice
will have no impact on the others’ well being. All individuals being identical they are
willing to take identical decisions. Since each individual decision has no impact on the
others, a Paretian social planner has no other possibility than deciding for everybody
what they would have decided for themselves. In particular the planner’s decision is
independent of whether individuals’ fates are determined by a single lottery that apply
to all, or by independent individual lotteries. These two cases would however gener-
ate very different degrees of inequalities in period 2. But the planner, being Paretian,
has to accept the levels of inequality arising from individuals’ preferred choices. He is
thus left with no possibility to express his own judgement about the socially optimal
level of inequality: the acceptance of the Pareto principle ex-ante prevents inequality
considerations ex-post.
Alternatively, one grasp the intuition of the result by considering Diamond (1967)’s
criticism of Harsanyi’s (1955) theorem. A simple way to obtain time consistency in a
dynamic setting involves relying on the expected utility framework. Harsanyi (1955)
proved that the only way to get a Paretian aggregation of preferences within the ex-
pected utility framework consists in having a social utility function which is an affine
combination of individuals’ utility functions. Diamond (1967) argued that this form of
preference aggregation annihilates the possibility of redistributing utility.
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Diamond’s remark, as well as the simple example we suggested above, motivate our
research. Our aim is to show that, far form being confined to particular cases (as in the
first example), or confined to a particular setting (expected utility framework, in the
Diamond-Harsanyi controversy), these insightful examples are the mere expression of
a general impossibility result whose formalization is precisely the object of our paper.
We will show indeed that considerations of inequality aversion become irrelevant when
the planner adheres to the Pareto principle while his dynamic preferences satisfy some
basic conditions - namely time consistency and consequentialism. While egalitarians
pointed at the Pareto principle as a potential obstacle to reach full equality, the Pareto
principle has much stronger consequences: it basically forbids the expression of different
concern for equality.
The present paper relates two lines of research: inequality aversion, on the one hand,
and dynamic choice under uncertainty, on the other hand. As such it uses contributions
from two broad but almost disconnected fields of literature. We borrow from the works
by Yaari (1969), Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974), Jewitt (1989) Grant and Quiggin (2005)
and Bosmans (2007) to provide a general definition of comparative inequality aversion.1
Concerning dynamic choice under uncertainty, we use the huge literature on the link
between consequentialism, linearity in mixture and time consistency. Among the most
relevant references are Myerson (1981), Johnsen and Donaldson (1985) and Sarin and
Wakker (1994). Two important conclusions of this literature are the following: first,
linearity in mixture is a very usual and practical way of ensuring the time consistency
of choices (Myerson, 1981). It is for this reason that one part of our paper will focus
1Note that all these papers except that of Bosmans deal with risk or uncertainty aversion. There
is however a direct link with the concept of inequality aversion we will use in the paper.
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on preferences that are linear in mixture. Second, in settings which are not embedded
with a natural mixture operation (e.g. when considering a finite set for the state of
the world), the assumption of time consistency is -in a consequentialist approach- akin
to a separability assumption which gives a particular structure to the representation of
dynamic preferences (Johnsen and Donaldson, 1985). Consequentialism and time con-
sistency are in fact at the heart of the folding back technique which is almost universally
adopted in recursive choices (Sarin and Wakker, 1994).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
the setting and provide a general definition of inequality aversion. In Section 3, we
consider the possibility of different degrees of inequality aversion when social observers
are Paretian. We first consider the case where they have preferences that are linear
in mixture. We show that it is impossible to have two Paretian social observers with
one being more inequality averse than the other. We then study a more general set up
where the choice space does not permit mixtures. Assuming time consistency of choices,
we obtain a similar result: a Paretian social observer cannot be more inequality averse
than another one after the initial period. Section 4 concludes.
2 Inequality aversion
Since the pioneering works by Atkinson (1970) and Kolm (1976), the degree of inequal-
ity aversion has been identified as a key element for policy assessment. Several papers
have provided characterizations of the degree of inequality aversion for specific mod-
els. Atkinson (1970) and Kolm (1976) are the basic references in the case of additive
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separable social evaluation functions. Donaldson and Weymark (1980) derive charac-
terizations in the case of Yaari social evaluation functions (which generalize the Gini
evaluation function).
However, in order to obtain general results, comparison of inequality aversion should
be independent of the acceptance of a particular model of social choice. Moreover, a
general definition should not be contingent on a particular structure for the set of
social consequences. In particular, to be relevant in complex settings (as with the case
of dynamic choice under uncertainty) it is necessary to consider a more general problem
than the allocation of a single transferable commodity between individuals.
Similar considerations are found in the literature on choice under uncertainty. While
the seminal contributions of Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965) were restricted to von
Neumann and Morgenstern (vNM) preferences over the set of monetary lotteries, it soon
appeared necessary to have a definition of comparative risk aversion that would neither
rely on the expected utility framework, nor be restricted to the case of unidimensional
lotteries. The contributions by Yaari (1969), Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974), Jewitt
(1989) and Grant and Quiggin (2005) - in the case of uncertainty aversion - worked in
that direction.
The common principle in these contributions is to associate a relation “more risk
averse than”(which involves comparing preferences) with any relation “riskier than”(which
involves comparing random elements). More precisely, given a relation “riskier than”a
decision maker A is said to be less (or no more) risk averse than B if any x which is
riskier than y and preferred to y by B is also preferred to y by A. The advantage is
that such a definition does not involve assuming a particular model of choice under
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uncertainty, and that it can be applied to complex domains of consequences.
Transposition to social choice for comparisons of inequality aversion is explicit in
Bosmans (2007). The same route will be taken in the present paper. However, a
difference will be that - for reasons explained below - we shall consider the relation
“more unequal than” introduced by Hammond (1976). This relation, which was not
considered by Bosmans, corresponds to the notion of single crossing of the cumulative
distribution functions introduced by Jewitt (1989).
2.1 The setting
We consider society composed of two individuals, denoted 1 and 2. The set of all
conceivable (or feasible) social alternatives is denoted by X. It is a general set with
no particular structure. We assume that each individual i ∈ {1, 2} is endowed with a
preference relation i on X.
We aim at comparing social preferences over X in terms of inequality aversion.
Discussing matters related to inequality involves being able to (ordinally) compare the
well being of the two individuals. Indeed, it would be meaningless to pretend taking
into account the inequality of a social alternative, if one is not even able to tell which
of the two individuals is better off.
We will therefore define a Social Observer (“SO”, hereafter) as being a utility func-
tion defined on X, allowing social alternatives to be ranked, and an interpersonal com-
parison function allowing the well-beings of individuals in the society to be compared.
More precisely:
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Definition 1 A Social Observer is the combination of:
1. A social evaluation function W : X → R.
2. An interpersonal utility function U : X × {1, 2} → R.
The social evaluation function W orders social alternatives. It represents the pref-
erences of the SO. The interpersonal utility function compares the relative situations
of the two individuals in alternative states of affairs. The inequality U(x, i) ≥ U(xˆ, j)
denotes the ethical judgement that individual i is better-off in the social alternative x
than j in the social alternative xˆ.
In most of the literature on inequality measurement, the interpersonal utility func-
tion is not formalized. For instance, papers on income inequality typically do not refer
to such an interpersonal utility functions. Still they assume that transfers from the rich
to the poor is socially desirable, which makes sense only if it is implicitly assumed that
an individual who earns more than another one is also better off.
In our general setting, we need a way to compare individual’s welfare, so that it
becomes possible to tell whether a policy that increase the welfare of an individual
but decrease the welfare of the other enhances or reduces inequality. This welfare
comparison is provided by the interpersonal utility function. Doing so, we also follow a
direction very common in the literature on multidimensional inequality. It consists in
first aggregating attributes at the individual level and then define inequality in terms
of utility.2
2See Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) and Maasoumi (1986).
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Since we have defined SOs as being utility functions (and not preference relations)
it will be useful to have the following definition:
Definition 2 Two functions V A : K → R and V B : K → R are ordinally congruent if
there exists an increasing function φ : R→ R such that
V A = φ(V B)
The above definition can apply either to SOs’ social evaluation functions (when
K = X) or to their interpersonal utility functions (when K = X × {1, 2}). Two
SOs with ordinally congruent social evaluation functions have the same preferences
over social alternatives. Two SOs with ordinally congruent interpersonal evaluation
functions always concur when comparing the individuals’ welfare.
If we endorse individualistic views, restrictions have to be placed upon the social
evaluation function and the interpersonal utility function. The SO’s assessment of indi-
vidual i’s welfare must conform with i’s point of view. Moreover, the social evaluation
function must accord with the Pareto principle which states that the unanimous agree-
ment of individuals has to be respected. We will call an SO that satisfies these two
properties ‘Paretian’.
Definition 3 An SO (W,U) is Paretian if:
1. His interpersonal utility function is such that U(., i) represents the preferences of
individual i:
U(x, i) ≥ U(xˆ, i)⇐⇒ x i xˆ ∀x, xˆ ∈ X, ∀i = 1, 2
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2. There exists a strictly increasing function W such that the social evaluation func-
tion W (x) is given by:
W (x) =W
(
U(x, 1), U(x, 2)
)
(1)
2.2 Comparative inequality aversion
In order to implement the procedure by Bosmans (2007) for defining a relation “more in-
equality averse than” one first needs to define a relation “more unequal than”. Bosmans
explored three definitions. One is the M -concept where x is at least as unequal as xˆ
if and only if xˆ describes a situation with perfect equality. The two other concepts are
based respectively on Lorenz domination and on relative differentials quasi-ordering,
both applied to the distribution of the U(., i).
None of the three definitions seemed adequate to us. The M -concept is, as its name
suggests, extremely minimalist, and leads to a very weak notion of comparative inequal-
ity aversion. In practice, the M -concept affords interesting results only when combined
with additional assumptions on the form of the social evaluation function (e.g. by as-
suming additive separability). The two other concepts are more constraining, but have
the drawbacks of not being ordinal, in the sense that two SOs with ordinally congruent
interpersonal utility functions would not necessarily agree on inequality comparisons.
Rather, we prefer to use the notion introduced by Hammond (1976) which allows
social alternatives to be compared even if none of them is characterized by full equality.
Definition 4 Given an interpersonal evaluation function U, a social alternative x ∈
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X is said to be at least as unequal as xˆ ∈ X, denoted xIU xˆ, if, for a pair (i, j) ∈
{(1, 2), (2, 1)}:
U(x, i) ≤ U(xˆ, i) ≤ U(xˆ, j) ≤ U(x, j)
or
U(x, i) ≤ U(xˆ, j) ≤ U(xˆ, i) ≤ U(x, j)
In addition, x ∈ X is more unequal than xˆ ∈ X, denoted xÎU xˆ, if there is at least one
strict inequality between the first and second terms or the third and fourth terms in the
above inequations.
It is clear that the relations IU and ÎU are transitive. Moreover, IU and ÎU are ordinal
concepts in the sense that if V = φ(U) for an increasing function φ then IU = IV and
ÎU = ÎV .
We can now implement Bosmans’s procedure to obtain a relation of comparative
inequality aversion.
Definition 5 An SO (WA, UA) is at least as inequality averse as an SO (WB, UB), if
and only if, for any xˆ ∈ X:
{
x ∈ X : xÎUA xˆ and WA(x) ≥ WA(xˆ)
}
⊂
{
x ∈ X : xÎUB xˆ and WB(x) ≥ WB(xˆ)
}
From the definition it is possible to derive characterization results in specific settings
(additively separable, Yaari or Quiggin social welfare functions, and so forth).3 But the
great advantage of Definition 3 is that it does not depend on a specific model of social
3For more details in a unidimensional setting, see Grant and Quiggin (2005).
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evaluation, in the same way as Yaari’s (1969) definition is not restricted to the expected
utility model. Definition 3 is consistent with but more general than views expressed in
the literature on inequality measurement.
Our very general definition of inequality aversion can be applied to complicated
consequence domains, for instance dynamic settings involving uncertainty. We are
therefore able to compare SO’s inequality aversion in these settings.
3 Time Consistency, consequentialism and Inequal-
ity Aversion
There is a broad literature on what should be the desirable properties of an SO’s pref-
erences in a dynamic context. A common assumption is that of time consistency, which
states that if an SO thinks that he will take a given action under certain circumstances,
he will actually stick to his plan if these circumstances do occur. Another common as-
sumption, central in the utilitarian doctrine, is that the SO should be consequentialist,
in the sense that his preferences regarding the future should be independent of what
could have happened in the past in other circumstances.
The fact that a well-behaved SO should be time consistent is not very controversial.
The assumption of consequentialism has however been criticized in several instances,
most notably by Diamond (1967), Machina (1989) and Epstein and Segal (1992). Yet,
in dynamic settings, consequentialism remains endorsed by most theorists. Defenses of
consequentialism have been proposed by Hammond (1988), Sarin and Wakker (1994),
and to some extend by Fleurbaey (2007).
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It is not our purpose, in the present paper, to debate about the desirability of
assuming time consistency and consequentialism. Our purpose is rather to emphasize
that these assumptions combined with the Pareto principle turn out to have significant
implications in terms of inequality aversion.
We will consider two different settings. In Section 3.1 we will explore the case of
preferences that are linear in mixture. Several papers, including Hammond (1988), or
Myerson (1981), argue that this property is necessary to guarantee time consistency. In
the context of consequentialist sequential choices, several papers have actually shown
that time consistency and the independence condition which corresponds to the lin-
earity in mixture assumption are closely related. More precisely, it has been shown in
consequentialist frameworks that time consistency combined with some other property
implies either the independence condition or the expected utility model.4
Moreover, the wide majority of choice models under risk and/or uncertainty fulfill an
assumption of (possibly partial) linearity in mixture. Examples are the expected utility,
the subjective expected utility a` la Anscombe and Auman (1963) or, in a restricted
sense, the dynamic model by Kreps and Porteus (1978). More recent models5 also
satisfy a form of partial linearity of mixture, and therefore will fit in this part. We
will indeed show that partial linearity in mixture makes it possible to derive a general
impossibility result about inequality aversion.
Still, especially when considering a relatively poor information context (like a finite
4The other property can be any one of the following: 1/ timing indifference (Chew and Epstein,
1989); 2/ reduction of compounded lotteries (Karni and Schmeidler, 1991); 3/ interchangeability of
consecutive decision nodes (Sarin and Wakker, 1994).
5For instance the Maxmin Expected Utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), the Choquet
Expected Utility of Schmeidler (1989) and more generally the invariant biseparable preferences of
Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2004)
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set for the state of the world), it is known since Johnsen and Donaldson (1985) that
linearity in mixture is not required to obtain time consistency. In Section 3.2, we
will therefore follow the approach of Johnsen and Donaldson and show that a similar
impossibility result can be derived.
3.1 Linearity in mixture
In this section, the temporal dimension of the decision problem need not be made
explicit, since only the assumption of linearity in mixture will be needed for our results.
We will simply assume agents have preferences over an abstract set X on which an
operation of mixture is defined. To apply our result to particular settings, such as
situations of risk, uncertainty, or temporal risk a` la Kreps and Porteus (1978), one only
needs to consider the appropriate set X.
A mixture operation ⊕ on X is an operation, which for all x and xˆ belonging to X
and all α ∈ [0, 1], provides an element αx⊕ (1− α)xˆ ∈ X such that:

0x⊕ 1xˆ = xˆ,
αx⊕ (1− α)xˆ = (1− α)xˆ⊕ αx for all x, xˆ ∈ X,
α[βx⊕ (1− β)xˆ]⊕ (1− α)xˆ = αβx⊕ (1− αβ)xˆ for all α, β ∈ [0, 1]
One typical example of mixture space is the space of all simple lotteries over a set
of payoffs. Let L1 and L2 be two lotteries. Let L3 be the compound lottery consisting
of playing L1 with probability α and L2 with probability 1 − α. The lottery L3 is a
mixture of L1 and L2, L3 = αL1 ⊕ (1− α)L2.
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Definition 6 A function F : X → R is continuous with respect to the mixture op-
eration ⊕ if, for all x, xˆ ∈ X, the function ψx,xˆ : [0, 1] → R such that ψx,xˆ(α) =
F
(
αx⊕ (1− α)x˜), is continuous.
Definition 7 A SO (W,U) is continuously linear in the mixture operation ⊕ with
respect to the subset X˜ ⊂ X if and only if, for all x, xˆ ∈ X, x˜ ∈ X˜, α ∈ (0, 1) and
i ∈ {1, 2}
W (x) ≥ W (xˆ)⇐⇒ W
(
αx⊕ (1− α)x˜
)
≥ W
(
αxˆ⊕ (1− α)x˜
)
U(x, i) ≥ U(xˆ, i)⇐⇒ U
(
αx⊕ (1− α)x˜, i
)
≥ U
(
αxˆ⊕ (1− α)x˜, i
)
and the three functions W , U(., 1) and U(., 2) are continuous with respect to the mixture
operation ⊕.
Whenever X˜ = X in Definition 7, we have the usual linearity in mixture property
that is satisfied by the expected utility representation, or Anscombe and Aumann (1963)
subjective expected utility. But Definition 7 can also encompass many other cases. For
instance, when discussing preferences over temporal lotteries, the Kreps and Porteus
(1978) recursive expected utility model satisfy linearity in mixture with respect to the
subset of temporal lotteries resolving in the last period of time.
Definition 7 also encompasses the property of certainty independence if X˜ is the set
of constant acts in an Anscombe-Aumann framework. Certainty independence is used
to characterize decision models that generalize subjective expected utility.6 Our result
thus extends to these models of choice and their dynamic extensions.
6See Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2004).
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We also need to introduce the following definition:
Definition 8 Given a SO (W,U), a subset X˜ ⊂ X is said to be socially ambivalent if
there exist x˜1 and x˜2 ∈ X˜ such that
U(x˜1, 1) < U(x˜1, 2) and U(x˜2, 1) > U(x˜2, 2)
Social ambivalence is a condition on the utility possibilities set. It amounts to
assuming that individuals’ welfare ranks can be inverted, so that one individual is not
systematically better off from the SO’s point of view. Social ambivalence is an ordinal
condition since two SOs with ordinally congruent interpersonal utility functions will
always agree on whether a subset is socially ambivalent.
Now we can state our result:
Proposition 1 Consider two Paretian SOs (WA, UA) and (WB, UB), who are contin-
uously linear in mixture with respect to a subset X˜ which is socially ambivalent for A.
If A is at least as inequality averse as B, then A and B have ordinally congruent social
evaluation functions.
Proof. Assume that WA(x) ≥ WA(xˆ). We need to show that WB(x) ≥ WB(xˆ).
If x Pareto dominates xˆ (in the broad sense that includes Pareto indifference) then
WB(x) ≥ WB(xˆ). So consider the case where x does not Pareto dominate xˆ and is
not Pareto indifferent to it. Since WA(x) ≥ WA(xˆ) we can assume without loss of
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generality that7
UA(x, 1) < UA(xˆ, 1)
UA(xˆ, 2) < UA(x, 2)
Now consider the mixtures
x′ = αx⊕ (1− α)x˜2
and
xˆ′ = αxˆ⊕ (1− α)x˜2
where x˜2 is the social alternative described in Definition 8.
Since UA(x˜2, 2) > U
A(x˜2, 1), and because U
A(., 1) and UA(., 2) are continuous with
respect to ⊕, we have for α close enough to 0
UA(xˆ′, 1) ≤ UA(xˆ′, 2)
By linearity in mixture, we also have UA(xˆ′, 2) < UA(x′, 2) and UA(x′, 1) < UA(xˆ′, 1).
Thus, for α close enough to 0,
UA(x′, 1) < UA(xˆ′, 1) ≤ UA(xˆ′, 2) ≤ UA(x′, 2)
7The case UA(xˆ, 1) < UA(x, 1) and UA(x, 2) < UA(xˆ, 2) can be dealt with using the same methods
as below. The only difference is that we should then use x˜1 rather than x˜2 for defining x′ and xˆ′ in
the remainder of the proof.
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Hence x′IˆUAxˆ′. By linearity in mixture, it is also the case that WA(x′) ≥ WA(xˆ′).
Thus, by comparative inequality aversion, WB(x′) ≥ WB(xˆ′). Finally, the linearity in
mixture of B’s preferences implies that WB(x) ≥ WB(xˆ).
Proposition 1 formalizes and generalizes Diamond’s (1967) criticism of Harsanyi’s
theorem. Diamond asserted that Harsanyi’s criterion is unfair because it precludes
redistributions of welfare. The argument was based on particular cardinal utility func-
tions for the individuals. Proposition 1 does not make such assumptions: only ordinal
representations are used. Besides, Proposition 1 clarifies the argument by showing that
inequality aversion is fixed when comparable. Proposition 1 is also not confined to a
particular choice situation; it encompasses most frameworks of choice under uncertainty.
One crucial assumption to obtain the result is that the subset X˜ is socially ambiva-
lent. The following example illustrates that, when the assumption does not hold, it is
possible for a Paretian SO to be more inequality averse than another.
Example: Consider two SOs (WA, U) and (WB, U) using the same inter-
personal utility function U . A has a social evaluation function WA(x) =
αA1 U(x, 1) + α
A
2 U(x, 2) and B has a social evaluation function W
B(x) =
αB1 U(x, 1) + α
B
2 U(x, 2), where α
A
1 + α
A
2 = α
B
1 + α
B
2 = 1. Assume also that
U(x, 1) < U(x, 2) for any x ∈ X, so that X is not socially ambivalent.
In that case, if αA1 > α
B
1 , then A is more inequality averse than B. In-
deed, for any x ∈ X, any more unequal situation xˆ is such that U(xˆ, 1) ≤
U(x, 1) ≤ U(x, 2) ≤ U(xˆ, 2). If WA(xˆ) ≥ WA(x), then αA1 U(xˆ, 1) +
αA2 U(xˆ, 2) ≥ αA1 U(x, 1) +αA2 U(x, 2). Consequently, U(xˆ,2)−U(x,2)U(x,1)−U(xˆ,1) ≥ α
A
1
αA2
>
αB1
αB2
,
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because αA1 > α
B
1 and α
A
1 + α
A
2 = α
B
1 + α
B
2 = 1. We hence find that(
xˆÎUx and W
A(xˆ) ≥ WA(x)
)
=⇒ WB(xˆ) > WB(x).
The conclusion of this section is that, whenever a subset of X is socially ambivalent,
we must weaken either the Pareto principle or (restricted) linearity in mixture in order
to escape the negative result of Proposition 1.
In Harsanyi’s framework, it has been suggested that we should weaken linearity in
mixture (Diamond, 1967). Some attempts in this direction have actually been made
(Epstein and Segal, 1992; Grant, Kajii, Polak and Safra, 2006). A difficulty with these
approaches is that they are prone to induce time inconsistent judgments under conse-
quentialist principles. The next section indeed shows that time consistency combined
with consequentialism and the Pareto principle prohibits comparisons in terms of in-
equality aversion.
3.2 A dynamic framework
Most of the time consistent dynamic models that are found in the literature fulfill an
assumption of linearity of mixture. The result of Proposition 1 can then be directly
applied. Though, linearity in mixture is not necessary to ensure time consistency. In-
deed, as explained in Johnsen and Donaldson (1985), under consequentialist principles,
time consistency implies a particular separability condition that they called “conditional
weak independence”. This condition is much weaker than the separability assumption
underlying the expected utility model.
The aim of this section, is to show that a result similar to Proposition 1 can be
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obtained, when considering the time consistency condition formalized by Johnsen and
Donaldson. Hence, while no linearity assumption is made, the conclusion of Proposition
1 still holds. This therefore shows the generality of our findings.
We consider a simple consequentialist intertemporal setting that extends to T peri-
ods the model proposed by Johnsen and Donaldson (1985). The time horizon is finite
and each period denoted by t ∈ {1, · · · , T}. Each period, any of S states of the world
can arise. Let Σ = {1, · · · , S}. For any arbitrary set K, let F(K) be the set of acts
defined as follows: F(K) = {f : Σ→ K}. In period t, the possible outcomes belong to
the set Zt. Each period, the decision maker must choose a course of action. We describe
the intertemporal choice problem recursively. We define the sets of temporal acts as
YT = ZT and, for all t ∈ {1, · · · , T−1}, Yt = Zt×F(Yt+1). For t > 1, we define histories
ht as the collection of past outcomes: ht ∈ Ht =
∏t−1
τ=1 Zτ . In a period t and given a
history ht, the decision maker is able to choose a course of action using the function
Uht,t : Yt → R. The decision maker’s dynamic preferences are completely represented by
the collection
{
Uht,t : t = 1, · · · , T ;ht ∈ Ht,
}
. We call
{
Uht,t : t = 1, · · · , T ;ht ∈ Ht,
}
- in short {Uht,t} - a process of preferences.
This formalization implicitly assumes that the decision maker is consequentialist, in
the following usual sense: what might have happened in unrealized states of the world
do not impact preferences over the future. We also assume that preferences are state
independent: preferences in period t do not dependent on which states of world have
occurred until period t included.
In line with Johnsen and Donaldson (1985), we consider the following additional
property of processes of preferences:
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Definition 9 A process of preferences {Uht,t} is time consistent if, for any t ∈ {1, · · · , T−
1}, ht ∈ Ht, zt ∈ Zt, ft, fˆt ∈ F(Yt+1):
U(ht,zt),t+1
(
ft(s)
)
≥ U(ht,zt),t+1
(
fˆt(s)
)
∀s ∈ Σ =⇒ Uht,t
(
zt, ft
)
≥ Uht,t
(
zt, fˆt
)
If, furthermore, U(ht,zt),t+1
(
ft(s
′)
)
> U(ht,zt),t+1
(
fˆt(s
′)
)
for some s′ ∈ Σ then:
Uht,t
(
zt, ft
)
> Uht,t
(
zt, fˆt
)
.
In the current framework, there is no definition of the mixture operation that could
render linearity in mixture appealing. The first period outcome is certain and can-
not be randomized. But, as emphasized by Johnsen and Donaldson (1985), the above
time-consistency principle implies “conditional weak independence”, a notion formally
defined in their paper. Using results by Koopmans (1972), Johnsen and Donaldson es-
tablish the utility representations that are equivalent to that separability condition, em-
phasizing that these are consistent with non linear models. In particular, the expected
utility model is a special case that corresponds to a stronger separability condition
(strong independence).
Now, consider two individuals 1 and 2, each endowed with a process of preferences
{U iht,t}. In the dynamic framework we have set up, we need to enlarge the notion of an
SO to include dynamic preferences.
Definition 10 An Social Observer is the combination of:
1. A collection of social evaluation functions Wht,t : Yt → R, one for each t ∈
{1, · · · , T} and ht ∈ Ht.
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2. A collection of interpersonal utility functions Uht,t : X × {1, 2} → R one for each
t ∈ {1, · · · , T} and ht ∈ Ht.
An SO is Paretian if the definition of a Paretian SO provided in Definition 3 applies
to Wht,t and Uht,t for each t ∈ {1, · · · , T} and ht ∈ Ht. A SO {(Wht,t, Uht,t)} is time
consistent if each process of preferences Wht,t, Uht,t(., 1) and Uht,t(., 2) is time consistent.
In the present framework, X ≡ Y1. Comparative inequality aversion is expressed in
terms of first period social evaluation functions and interpersonal utility functions.
As above, an additional assumption must be made to obtain the analog of Propo-
sition 1. The assumption guarantees that individuals’ welfare rank can be inverted by
ensuring a particular outcome in sufficiently numerous states of the world.
Definition 11 A state of the world s ∈ Σ is socially revertible for an SO {(Wht,t, Uht,t)}
if, for all z1 ∈ Z1, there exist y˜12 and y˜22 in Y2 such that, whatever y2 ∈ Y2, if f1(s) =
fˆ1(s) = y2, and, for all s
′ 6= s, f1(s′) = y˜12 and fˆ1(s′) = y˜22 then: U1
(
(z1, f1), 1
)
>
U1
(
(z1, f1), 2
)
and U1
(
(z1, fˆ1), 2
)
> U1
(
(z1, fˆ1), 1
)
.
The existence of a socially revertible state of the world represents two ideas. First,
this state of the world is sufficiently unimportant (‘sufficiently unlikely’) so that what
occurs in other states of the world can fully fix the relative situation of individuals.
Second, it is possible to invert individuals’ welfare ranks. The second idea is closely
related to the existence of a socially ambivalent set of social alternatives.
Whenever there exists a socially invertible state of the world, we can obtain a result
similar to Proposition 1.
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Proposition 2 Consider two Paretian SOs {(WAht,t, UAht,t)} and {(WBht,t, UBht,t)}, who are
time consistent. If 1/ there exists a state of the world s ∈ Σ that is socially invertible
for {(WAht,t, UAht,t)}, and 2/ A is at least as inequality averse as B; then A and B have
ordinally congruent social evaluation functions after the initial period.
Proof. We first prove that A and B must have the same preferences in period 2.
Consider any z1 ∈ Z1, y2 and yˆ2 in Y2. Assume that WAz1,2(y2) ≥ WAz1,2(yˆ2). We want to
show that WBz1,2(y2) ≥ WBz1,2(yˆ2).
If y2 Pareto dominates yˆ2 given z1, then W
B
z1,2
(y2) ≥ WBz1,2(yˆ2). So consider the case
where y2 does not Pareto dominate yˆ2. Assume for instance that:
8
UAz1,2(y2, 1) < U
A
z1,2
(yˆ2, 1)
UAz1,2(yˆ2, 2) < U
A
z1,2
(y2, 2)
Now consider the first period acts y1 = (z1, f1) and yˆ1 = (z1, fˆ1) where f1(s) = y2,
fˆ1(s) = yˆ2 and f1(s
′) = fˆ1(s′) = y˜22 for all s
′ 6= s, with y˜22 defined as in Definition 11.
By time consistency, we have WA1 (y1) ≥ WA1 (yˆ1). By time consistency, it must also be
the case that UA1 (y1, 1) < U
A
1 (yˆ1, 1) and U
A
1 (yˆ1, 2) < U
A
1 (y1, 2). And, since s is socially
revertible for SO A, we have UA1 (yˆ1, 2) > U
A
1 (yˆ1, 1).
We end up with WA1 (y1) ≥ WA1 (yˆ1) and y1IˆUA1 yˆ1 because
UA1 (y1, 1) < U
A
1 (yˆ1, 1) < U
A
1 (yˆ1, 2) < U
A
1 (y1, 2)
8The case UAz1,2(y2, 1) > U
A
z1,2(yˆ2, 1) and U
A
z1,2(yˆ2, 2) > U
A
z1,2(y2, 2) can be treated similarly using
y˜12 instead of y˜
2
2 in the remainder of the proof.
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Comparative inequality aversion implies that WB1 (y1) ≥ WB1 (yˆ1). But given the
definition of y1 and yˆ1 and since the SO B is time consistent, this is possible only if
WBz1,2(y2) ≥ WBz1,2(yˆ2).
Then, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 1 If two SOs have time consistent preferences then:
If they have the same preferences in period 2 for any z1, then they have the same
preferences in period t ≥ 2 for any history ht ∈ Ht.
Proof. Assume that WAht,t(yt) ≥ WAht,t(yˆt) with ht = (z1, z2, · · · , zt−1). We need to
show that WBht,t(yt) ≥ WBht,t(yˆt).
Consider the subsequent periods acts defined inductively in the following way: y2 =
(z2, f2) with f2 ∈ F(Y3) and such that f2(s) = y3 for all s ∈ Σ; and, ∀τ ∈ {4, · · · , t},
yτ−1 = (zτ−1, fτ−1) with fτ−1 ∈ F(Yτ ) and such that fτ−1(s) = yτ for all s ∈ Σ.
Similarly, define the subsequent periods acts in the following way: yˆ2 = (z2, fˆ2)
with fˆ2 ∈ F(Y3) and such that fˆ2(s) = yˆ3 for all s ∈ Σ; and, ∀τ ∈ {4, · · · , t}, yˆτ−1 =
(zτ−1, fˆτ−1) with fˆτ−1 ∈ F(Yτ ) and such that fˆτ−1(s) = yˆτ for all s ∈ Σ.
By time consistency, WAht,t(yt) ≥ WAht,t(yˆt) =⇒ WAz1,2(y2) ≥ WAz1,2(yˆ2). Since A and B
have the same preferences in period 2, it is also the case that WBz1,2(y2) ≥ WBz1,2(yˆ2). The
time consistency of B’s preferences hence yields WBz1,2(y2) ≥ WBz1,2(yˆ2) =⇒ WBht,t(yt) ≥
WBht,t(yˆt).
Obviously, Lemma 1 ends the proof.
Proposition 2 proves that two time consistent and Paretian SOs with comparable
degrees of inequality aversion must have the same preferences after the initial period.
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Hence, after the initial period, inequality aversion is constrained. If we consider that
period 1 has already occurred, the result is the same as in Proposition 1, but it relies
one much weaker grounds, namely time consistency.
A few points deserve comment. First, we have assumed throughout the section
that S > 1. Otherwise, Assumption 2 cannot be stated. The fact that S > 1 is
actually crucial to obtain Proposition 2. It is perfectly possible to obtain more inequality
averse Paretian SOs in a deterministic intertemporal framework (see Atkinson and
Bourguignon, 1982).
A second point is that continuity is not necessary to obtain Proposition 2, contrary
to what was the case for Proposition 1. We do not need to make assumptions on the
structure of Zt. We make no assumptions on preferences except representability and
time consistency. Hence, Proposition 2 relies on rather weak grounds.
A third point is that state independence is also not necessary to obtain the result.
We have assumed state independence for convenience. But it is clear from the proof of
Proposition 2 that the result could be obtained in a state dependent framework provided
that Assumption 2 is true for any s ∈ Σ. More precisely, if all states of the world are
sufficiently unimportant so that guaranteeing given allocations in all other states allows
individuals’ welfare ranks to be inverted, the proof in Proposition 2 ensures that the
two SOs have the same (state dependent) ordering in second period.
It is however crucial to assume that unrealized prospects do not matter in second
period. Without this consequentialist assumption, the result exposed in Proposition 2
cannot be obtained.
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4 Conclusion
We have shown that the time consistency of choices in uncertain consequentialist frame-
works implies that we cannot find two social Paretian social observers, with one being
more inequality averse than the other one. Two conditions are necessary to obtain this
impossibility result: there must be some uncertainty, and we must be able to invert
people’s welfare ranks in some social alternatives.
We first derived the result in the case of preferences that are linear in mixture. But,
we have also shown that even when mixture operations do not exist, the inequality
aversion of Paretian SOs is constrained. If we accept the rationality requirements
of time consistency and consequentialism, we are thus left with a conflict between
individualistic principles and the willingness to reduce inequalities.
The reason is that the Pareto principle forces the social observer to respect indi-
viduals’ intertemporal choices. But the preferences of individuals in uncertain dynamic
frameworks directly impact the inequality of social outcomes. If we endorse the (ex-
ante) Pareto principle, the inequalities arising ex-post from people’s choices must be
accepted, how broad they may be, and there is no room for expressing personal views
on the acceptable degree of inequality.
This result leaves us with a difficult dilemma. Either we follow a purely individ-
ualistic path and forget about any considerations related to inequality aversion. Or
we take into account more redistributive views and have to intervene in individuals’
intertemporal decisions. This second path differs from the usual arguments in favor
of paternalistic interventions. The Pareto principle is often deemed unappealing when
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individuals make ‘inappropriate’ intertemporal decision, for instance when they make
dynamically inconsistent choices, or when they have incorrect beliefs, etc. Here, pater-
nalistic interference arises from the ethically defendable concern for equality.
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